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product development to success is compelling, Vesey (1991) reported on a study of high-technology products, showing that products that were six months late in entering the market, but were within budget, earned 33 percent less over a five-year period than they would have if on time. Entering the market on time, even 50 percent over budget, reduced a firm's profitability by only 4 percent for that product. Moreover, fast product development is usually more productive and lower cost, because lengthy time in product development tends to waste resources on peripheral activities, changes, and mistakes (Stalk and Hout, 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) , Thus, although there may be pitfalls to rapid product development (von Braun, 1990) , it is often essential for the successful adaptation and, ultimately, for the survival of firms.
But how do firms develop products quickly? Several previous research streams provide some insights. One stream synthesizes the experiences of the authors, often people with decades of experience in product development (e.g.. Gold, 1987; Rosenau, 1988; Stalk and Hout, 1990; Cordero, 1991; Vesey, 1991) , Although they typically have little systematic data or theoretical foundation, they do tend to have captivating anecdotes and many ideas for managerial practice. Drawing on his extensive industrial experience, Rosenau (1988) , for example, enumerated about 10 factors that are organized around the key idea of shortening the time of steps in the development process. Similarly, Cordero (1991) drew on his industry experience to emphasize the use of computer-aided design (CAD) as well as careful planning and targeted rewards to accelerate product development, A second stream emphasizes impressionistic data gathered from managers engaged in product development (e,g,, Gupta and Wilemon, 1990; Mabert, Muth, and Schmenner, 1992; McDonough, 1993) , Typically, the methodology involves using surveys to gather the broad, general attitudes and opinions of single informants within a firm about fast product development, Gupta and Wilemon (1990) surveyed 80 managers on the factors that they believed would speed up and slow down product development. Among these factors are the importance of senior management support, multifunctional involvement, and detailed product requirements planning, Millson, Raj, and Wilemon (1992) extended this work to a rational blueprint for accelerating new product development: (1) simplify, (2) eliminate delay, (3) eliminate steps, (4) speed up operations, and (5) perform parallel processes, A third research stream is characterized by in-depth case studies or small-sample studies conducted in global industries, frequently emphasizing the virtues of Japanese management (e.g., Quinn, 1985; Imai, Nonaka, and Takeuchi, 1985; Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto, 1987; Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990; lansiti, 1992) , Imai, Nonaka, and Takeuchi (1985) studied five innovative and successful Japanese products, each representing a different technology-based industry. The authors argued that an involved supplier network has the strongest effect on the speed of development. In a later study, Clark and his colleagues (Clark, Chew, and Fujinnoto, 1987; Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark, 1988; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) found that supplier involvement, nnultifunctional teanns, and overlapping product development stages are among the pivotal determinants of rapid product development in the global automotive industry.
Taken together, these research results outline broad factors, such as planning, the use of CAD, supplier involvement, powerful project leaders, and multifunctional teams that quicken the pace of product development. This work gives much needed insight into fast product development. Yet these ideas often rest on impressionistic data from the authors' career experiences or managers' subjective perceptions of product development processes. Although the data underlying the third stream are more systematic, even here, the theory is modest, the sample sizes are small, and there is limited or no multivariate testing of hypotheses. Also, since most of these studies emphasize the management practices of successful Japanese companies, often in the auto industry (e.g., Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) , their generalizability is confounded by the questions of whether the results are unique to Japan or to large, mechanical assembly products.
In contrast to the research on fast product development, a few authors have looked at pace outside of the product development context. Bastien and Hostager (1988) explained how jazz musicians relied on improvisation to create innovative music rapidly. Eisenhardt (1989) examined how executives make fast strategic decisions in the high-velocity, computer industry. Weick (1993) described how some firefighters quickly assessed a catastrophic situation and lived, while others perished. In each of these studies, the situations are highly uncertain, and the people involved rely on highly experiential and real-time information in the context of targeted structure to achieve fast pace. Unlike the product development research, this work suggests achieving fast pace by relying on iterative experiences, flexibility, and improvisation. This paper explores rapid adaptive processes, focusing on product innovation as a crucial adaptive process. We create two theoretical models, one building on existing product development research and the other relying on findings that emphasize real-time experience, flexibility, and improvisation. We then examine them with data from 72 product development projects from 36 Asian, U,S,, and European firms operating in the fast-paced, global computer industry. The computer industry is characterized by short product life cycles, intense and international competition, an evolving scientific base, and a lack of Japanese domination. It is a high-velocity industry where speed matters (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988) , At a higher level, the paper attempts to open up organization theory to a more dynamic conception of firms. Much of organization theory is locked into static equilibrium models, such as transaction-cost economics, resource dependence, agency, and contingency theories. Even organization ecology, which is dynamic at the population level, is largely 86/ASQ, March 1995 inertial at the firm level, and models of change, such as punctuated equilibrium are, in fact, highly static. Yet fast pace and quick adaptation have emerged as central, competitive capabilities for contemporary firms (Eisenhardt, 1989; D'Aveni, 1994; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996) . The two theoretical models developed here sketch potential organizational forms for creating such core capabilities. We also attempt to contribute to the innovation literature by developing more theoretically based models of rapid product development and testing them using a larger sample and more systematic research design than previous work.
BACKGROUND
A classic distinction in organizational thinking is between situations that can be described as certain, predictable, well-understood, or routine and situations that are characterized as unpredictable, intractable, or uncertain (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Galbraith, 1973; Scott, 1987 ). An implication of this distinction is that when situations are certain or predictable, then people can plan and organize their activities to rely on routine and bureaucratic organization (Galbraith, 1973 ). When uncertainty reigns, then people adjust to this lack of information by being more experimental, flexible, and even improvisational (Scott, 1987) .
This distinction appears in numerous areas of organizational inquiry. In organizational design, authors describe how conditions of low uncertainty are best adapted to bureaucratic or mechanistic organizations, while in conditions of high uncertainty, more flexible, adaptive, organic organizations are appropriate (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1973) . The distinction also appears in decision-making theories. Fredrickson (1984) advised that when uncertainty is low, rational models of goals and choice processes are appropriate, whereas less comprehensive models become relevant in more uncertain, turbulent settings. Typologies of efficient problem-solving strategies for differing technologies (Thompson, 1967; Perrow, 1986) and organizational control (Ouchi, 1980) also reflect the distinction between certain and uncertain tasks.
This same distinction emerges in the nascent theorizing about fast product development. One approach, drawing from much of the existing product development literature surveyed above (e.g., Rosenau, 1988; Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990; Stalk and Hout, 1990; Millson, Raj, and Wilemon, 1992) , as well as disciplines such as civil engineering, is based on what we term the compression strategy. It assumes that product development is a predictable series of steps that can be compressed. Acceleration involves planning these steps (e.g., Gupta and Wilemon, 1990; Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990) , simplifying them through supplier involvement (e.g., Imai, Nonaka, and Takeuchi, 1985; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) , shortening the time that it takes to complete each step in the development process (e.g., Rosenau, 1988; Stalk and Hout, 1990; Cordero, 1991) , overlapping development steps (Stalk and Hout, 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) , and rewarding designers for speed (e.g.. Gold, 1987) . Overall, this strategy involves rationalizing the steps of the product developnnent process and then squeezing or connpressing them together.
An alternative view is what we term the experiential strategy. The basic ideas here are found in a variety of fields, including improvisation (Bastien and Hostager, 1988; Weick, 1993; Moorman and Miner, 1994) , chemistry and biochemistry (Curtis and Barnes, 1989) , neurobiology (Levy, 1994) , cognitive psychology (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1988) , and strategic choice (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992) , as well as in some product development literature (e.g., Quinn, 1985) . The key assumption here is that product development is a very uncertain path through foggy and shifting markets and technologies. Thus acceleration in this scenario involves rapidly building intuition and flexible options so as to cope with an unclear and changing environment. Yet, simultaneously, it also involves providing enough structure so that people will create sensemaking, avoid procrastination, and be confident enough to act in these highly uncertain situations, which easily lead to paralyzing anxiety and conflict. This approach is thus more a response to uncertainty than certainty, more iterative than linear, and more experienced-based than planned.
The thesis here is that both compression and experiential strategies accelerate product development. Yet because they have different assumptions about the underlying process (i.e., certainty vs. uncertainty), they do so in different ways. To the extent that product development is a predictable path through well-known markets and technologies, then the compression strategy is relevant. If the path is more uncertain, then an experiential strategy is relevant. In the next sections, we expand these strategies through a series of hypotheses and examine them empirically.
Hypotheses
Compression strategy. The underlying assumption of the compression strategy is that product development is a predictable or certain process, one that can be planned out as a series of discrete steps. Such a process can then be compressed by shortening the time of each step, overlapping the execution of successive steps, and rewarding developers for attaining the compressed schedule. The result is accelerated product development.
From a compression perspective, more time spent in planning is particularly important for squeezing product development time. By emphasizing planning, product developers can better understand and rationalize the development process (Gupta and Wilemon, 1990) . This, in turn, allows them to eliminate unnecessary steps (Cordero, 1991) and sequence activities in efficient order. Without such planning, developers are more likely to do tasks that are not needed or to do them incorrectly, resulting in wasted resources through substantial delays and backtracking as these mistakes are fixed. Further, more time spent in planning can also help developers to delegate steps appropriately to the best-qualified people, who, in turn, can probably execute the task most quickly. Thus more time spent in planning should help shorten project time by rationalizing the process, reducing mistakes, and shortening delays (e.g,, Rosenau, 1988; Gupta and Wilemon, 1990; Cordero, 1991; lansiti, 1992) , Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark (1988) explicitly noted the importance of predevelopment planning to fast product development.
More time spent in planning also squeezes development time because it can help to smooth interactions among developers and gain resources, both of which can accelerate pace. Planning provides a blueprint for action that organizes project team interaction. Such planning can limit misunderstandings and reduce time-consuming coordination problems, as team members can refer to the plan for common language and understanding, Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990) observed that when lean automotive manufacturers spent substantial effort in planning, conflicts were resolved and the projects moved ahead more quickly. Lack of resources can also be a roadblock to fast product development. Development teams that spend more time planning may have an edge in gaining resources because planning can enhance the appearance of being competent and well organized (Pfeffer, 1992) , Thus extensive planning can serve as an important signal of project quality (Feldman and March, 1981) , In formal terms:
Hypothesis 1 (HI): More time spent in planning is associated with shorter development time, A key assumption of the compression perspective is that product development is a series of predictable steps. Because the development steps are clear in advance, another way to shorten development time is to delegate the execution of those steps to another organization through supplier involvement (Gold, 1987; Imai, Nonaka, and Takeuchi, 1985; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) , Supplier involvement in many stages of the process reduces the workload of the focal team, as Clark and Fujimoto (1991) found in their study of the automotive industry, because the work of developing ideas and designs is shared with suppliers. Further, supplier involvement allows the focal developers to focus on the execution of tasks that take advantage of their key competencies and skills. Product development time is also shortened because suppliers can exploit their own competencies as well. Thus, since those with more expertise can execute tasks faster, supplier involvement in more steps of the design process should reduce product development time.
Supplier involvement is also fast for other reasons. If suppliers are involved in many steps of the process, then they are more likely to catch future problems, such as contradictory specifications or unrealistic designs, sooner in the process, when they are easier to fix. Supplier involvement also improves thinking about the product design by integrating suppliers' ideas and alternative perspectives into the product in more stages of the process. In their study of six product development projects among heavy industrial manufacturers in the U,S, midwest, Mabert, Muth, Personal communication with Andrew Hargadon, a Ph,D, student at Stanford University and former productdevelopment engineer.
and Schmenner (1992) found that the suppliers were involved in many stages of fast projects. In formal terms: Hypothesis 2 (H2): More supplier involvement is associated with shorter development time. Product development time can also be compressed by shortening the time of individual steps in the development process (e,g,, Rosenau, 1988; Stalk and Hout, 1990) , While approaches to trimming step time may vary with different types of development processes, one important tool is CAD (Rosenau, 1988) , As Cordero (1991) observed, CAD speeds up computation times in the design process by allowing developers to reach a final design more quickly through the automation of predictable computational procedures. More CAD use in the development process should shorten the entire process by accelerating the computations of individual engineers.
More CAD use by developers also shortens predictable processes through the reuse of past designs (Huber, 1991) , Reusing past learning and expertise should dramatically shorten actual design time and lead to fewer errors downstream that need to be corrected. Such reuse should significantly reduce the risk of a product's nonfunctionality at a later date, when such errors are much more difficult to fix.
Finally, more CAD use by developers can also smooth interaction among project team members, CAD systems give developers an electronic communication net that can expedite both communication and coordination among product designers,'' In formal terms: Hypothesis 3 (H3): More designers using computer-aided design (CAD) is associated with shorter development time. Compression of product development steps involves not only shortening individual steps, but also reducing the wait time between steps or even overlapping those steps (Stalk and Hout, 1990) , Predictable steps can be overlapped because they are better known in advance, more tasks can be accomplished in parallel, and the waiting time between steps can be eliminated by overlapping these steps, Imai, Nonaka, and Takeuchi (1985) found that problem solving could be overlapped by overlaying engineering and production phases in the development of a successful (and fast time-to-market) copier developed by Fuji-Xerox, Likewise, Clark and Fujimoto (1991) found that overlapping steps, such as integrating die design and die making, significantly reduced product cycle time. Drawing from their experience, other authors (e,g,. Gold, 1987; Cordero, 1991) have given similar importance to project overlap. Therefore:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): A higher degree of project overlap is associated with shorter development time. Multifunctional teams are closely linked to successful project overlap (e,g,, Quinn, 1985; Stalk and Hout, 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) because the different stages rely on differing blends of multifunctional expertise. Such teams permit development steps to be integrated and link technical, marketing, and manufacturing activities. Such teams also speed up the product development process because downstream problems in the various functional areas are more likely to be observed early in the process.
90/ASQ, March 1995 when they are easier to correct (e.g., Imai, Nonaka, and Takeuchi, 1985; Gold, 1987) . Further, involving more functions early in the process reduces the wait time between steps (Stalk and Hout, 1990), The time that it takes to move between design and prototype manufacturing, for example, is likely to be reduced when manufacturing people are already present on the team (e,g,, Gupta and Wilemon, 1990; Cordero, 1991; Mabert, Muth, and Schmenner, 1992) , In formal terms:
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Multifunctional teams are associated with shorter developnnent time.
The above hypotheses involve compressing development time through up-front planning, leveraging the expertise of suppliers, using CAD to cut the execution time of individual development steps, and overlapping product development phases through the use of multifunctional teams. Our final compression hypothesis addresses motivating developers to shorten process time.
As suggested by agency, achievement, and learning theories of motivation, as well as by some product development writers (e,g,. Gold, 1987; Gupta and Wilemon, 1990; Cordero, 1991) , rewards can have an important effect on product development speed. This is particularly true when the development process is predictable. In these situations, an explicit development schedule can be created, and rewards can be tied to meeting that schedule. Rewards based on schedule attainment focus the attention of developers on the particular project at hand, rather than on other projects, and on time-based performance, rather than on other issues, such as the technological sophistication of the product. This increases speed because it limits efforts that are peripheral to the central task.
In addition, rewarding product developers for achieving clear deadlines better synchronizes the energies and attention of the team (Gersick, 1988) , Clear goals also typically create team alignment (e,g,, Sherif et al,, 1961) and so limit time-consuming bickering about the ultimate agenda of the group. For all of these reasons, rewarding the project team for schedule attainment should focus and motivate developers to shorten product development time. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Greater reward for schedule attainment is associated with shorter development time.
Experiential strategy. In contrast to the compression strategy, the experiential strategy suggests that moving faster simply by accelerating an existing, albeit streamlined process is unrealistic. The underlying assumption here is that product development is a highly uncertain path through foggy and shifting markets and technologies. The key to fast product development is, then, rapidly building intuition and iflexible options in order to learn quickly about and shift with uncertain environments. At the same time, it is also important to create structure and motivate pace in these settings, because the uncertainty can create paralyzing anxiety about the future (George, 1980; Weick, 1993), Thus fast pace entails both cognitive and emotional issues, From the experiential perspective, one way to speed up product development is through frequent iteration. Just as catalysts and heat accelerate chemical reactions by creating more opportunities for reactions to occur (Curtis and Barnes, 1989) , multiple design iterations (also termed "prototyping" in some popular literature) accelerate product design by simply offering more opportunities or chances for a "hit." These design iterations can be simultaneous, alternative designs, designs that are iterations of previous designs, or some combination of the two. Regardless of the actual iteration pattern, simply increasing the number of design iterations improves the odds of success and thus accelerates the process, particularly when predictable paths do not exist.
Iterations also shorten development time for other, more subtle reasons. They accelerate the building of understanding about the product. By trying design variations, developers can gain an intuitive feel for the sensitivity of the parameters and the robustness of the designs. Similar to situated learning (e.g.. Brown, Collins, and Duguid, 1989; Lave and Wenger, 1991) , learning by doing through multiple iterations is a quicker way to learn than less participative and more cognitive strategies. Further, as several authors have described (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989) , judging the worth of an iteration is particularly difficult in unpredictable settings. Multiple iterations make such judgments easier, since comparing alternatives makes strengths and weaknesses much more apparent (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson,1988; Eisenhardt, 1989) .
Iterations also build more flexibility into understanding. Many iterations improve cognitive ability to shift with new information (Eisenhardt, 1989; Weick, 1993) . Also, when there are many iterations, designers are also less likely to become attached to one particular variation and so are better able to adjust if changing conditions warrant it. Finally, iterations shorten the process by improving the confidence of development teams. Teams that have created multiple iterations will be less likely to procrastinate because they worry that they may be missing better alternatives and so be more able to settle on a design (Eisenhardt, 1989) . In formal terms: Hypothesis 7 (H7): More design iterations are associated with shorter development time. Testing throughout the design process is closely related to frequent iterations. Testing reveals problems that can then be addressed in subsequent design iterations. Testing speeds product development because developers are more likely to discover errors earlier in the process, when they are easier to correct (Gupta and Wilemon, 1990) . Testing throughout the development process gives frequent evaluations of the current design. In contrast, without extensive testing, developers may uncover their errors too late. Testing is especially important in uncertain situations, in which developers are more likely to discover, rather than anticipate errors.
A related advantage is that extensive testing accelerates understanding and reconceptualization of the product through trial and error learning. By confronting real data about actual results, such as some aspect of the design that 92/ASa March 1995 does not work or works differently than anticipated, the product team is firmly forced out of faulty preconceptions (Mabert, Muth, and Schmenner, 1992; von Hippel and Tyre, 1993) . The result is a process in which developers are likely to update and improve their thinking frequently throughout the design process in response to concrete results.
While the above reasons emphasize the cognitive aspect of the speed advantages of extensive testing, there are emotional advantages as well. Testing also increases speed because it builds developers' confidence. When product teams test particular designs, the development process becomes more concrete and believable. Like what happens in the illusion of control (Langer, 1975) , developers gain confidence because they have proactively engaged in a concrete action. This is especially relevant in unpredictable situations, in which people often procrastinate in the face of uncertainty (George, 1980) . Testing throughout the development process also increases speed because it creates many failures from which designers can learn. Moreover, because the testing is on-going, the size of any particular failure is likely to be small, since designers have probably incorporated the learning from earlier failures. Such small, frequent failures are very motivating and create particularly rapid learning because they capture people's attention but yet are not so large as to raise denial or blocking defenses (Sitkin, 1992) .
Finally, testing increases development speed because attending to the kind of factual and concrete information that testing provides grounds discussions in concrete facts, rather than in abstractions that can lead to endless conflict and interpersonal animosity. Several studies outside of product development illustrate this phenomenon. Murnighan and Conlon (1991) found that string quartets that concentrated on playing music, rather than on discussing musical choices, got along better. Similarly, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1995) found that slavish attention to factual operating and environmental data was characteristic of top management teams that could disagree, but could still get along. In formal terms:
Hypothesis 8 (H8): More time spent in testing throughout the development process is associated with shorter development time. Frequent milestones (i.e., formal project review points) also accelerate product development, but such milestones do not imply comprehensive planning. Rather, they suggest frequent reassessment of the current state of progress. Frequent milestones shorten development time because they force people to look often at what they are doing so that if actions are off-course, they can be corrected earlier in the process. Particularly in uncertain situations, frequent milestones are an effective way of checking current progress against evolving markets and technologies (Gersick, 1994) . Milestones also provide a sense of order and routine that serves as a counterpoint to the more freewheeling and even chaotic activities of iteration and testing (Bastien and Hostager, 1988; Weick, 1993) .
Frequent milestones also shorten development time because they are motivating. Their frequency creates a 93/ASO, March 1995 experiential models. Table 1 sense of urgency that keeps developers from procrastinating (e,g,, Gersick, 1988) , Achieving the milestones can also give people a sense of control and accomplishment that can be very motivating (McClelland, 1961; Langer, 1975) , In addition, they also may promote coordination and communication among different parts of the development team. In contrast, with widely spaced milestones, problems are spotted later, when it is usually harder to readjust. Project progress can stall or go off track because of limited or incorrect direction, and misunderstandings can arise because of lack of communication and coordination of activities among developers. The adaptive process can fail because it becomes too unstructured and chaotic (Waldrop, 1992) , In formal terms:
Hypothesis 9 (H9): Less time between milestones is associated with shorter development time.
Powerful leaders also help to accelerate product development by keeping the process focused. Such a highly iterative and experiential process can lose its focus if the product team loses sight of the "big picture," Conflicts and confusion can emerge. Powerful project leaders are essential to hold the product development process together. Such leaders accelerate the speed of product development by maintaining a disciplining vision that keeps the chaos of experiential product development under control (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995a) , Such a leader is also better able to secure the resources that the team needs to execute the design task, Clark and his colleagues (Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto, 1987; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) have provided evidence for the importance of a powerful leader to the pace of a product development project. They used the term "heavyweight" to describe project leaders who report to high levels within the hierarchy, have high status within the organization, and have direct responsibility for many aspects of the project. They found that projects managed by heavyweight managers had a nine-month advantage over projects run by managers with little influence. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 10 (H10): Greater power of the project leader is associated with shorter development time. We chose to use data from the computer industry because the quickly evolving scientific and competitive base and modest capital intensity contribute to making this a high-velocity industry in which rapid pace is critical (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988) . In addition, in contrast with several important previous studies (Imai, Nonaka, and Takeuchi. 1985; Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990; Clark and Fujimoto. 1991) , we also wanted to focus on an industry that was not dominated by Japanese competitors or by large, mechanical designs. Large firms were chosen so that we could study established development processes rather than the more idiosyncratic and developing processes of young and small firms.
The research team sent letters to the presidents or relevant vice presidents of these companies, asking them to participate in the study, and followed up with telephone calls. Executives were assured of the confidentiality of their data and that only aggregate data would be reported.
The unit of analysis is the product development project. Within each company, we studied two product development projects within a single product group. Research team members and firm executives jointly chose these two projects to ensure recent projects at similar levels of complexity within industry segments. Most projects had been completed within four to nine months of the study. A few were as old as 12 months or as recent as two months.
We studied one medium-sized development project and one major development project in each firm. A major project was defined as one involving significant innovation, a new product generation, and/or a major commitment of resources. A medium-scale project was defined as a representative or typical project resulting in a new product. Research team members worked with firm executives to ensure a consistent interpretation of medium and major across firms, particularly within industry segments. Major projects usually were those to develop a new hardware platform. Medium projects usually involved the development of a new product within an existing platform family and computer architecture, such as a new model with higher processor speed, more input/output slots, or other similar functionality features. Executives preferred to select their most recent projects so that the resulting information would reflect their current practices.
Thirty-six computer companies participated in the study, with each contributing two products from a single strategic business unit (SBU), for a total of 72 products. The response rate was approximately 70 percent. The high response rate appears to be due to extensive corporate interest in the benchmarking information from the study. Firms were to obtain feedback at the end of the study comparing their practices with those of others. Reasons for declining to participate primarily revolved around the firms' personnel being too busy. Reflecting the composition of the global computer industry, 50 percent of the firms were from the U.S., 30 percent from Asia, and 20 percent from Europe. Most firms were begun since 1970, with the majority having been launched since 1980, Reflecting the composition of the industry, the sample of projects was approximately 48 percent personal computer, 19 percent peripherals, 14 percent mainframe, and 19 percent minicomputer projects. While sampling bias is always a possibility when there are nonrespondents, the potential for sampling bias was reduced by high response rates, roughly equal response rates across geographic regions, and the constrained variation of age and firm size within the population.
Data Collection
Data were collected using a detailed instrument that included top management, marketing, manufacturing, and finance sections as well as the product development section studied here. The total instrument was 107 pages long, including a 29-page product development section. The product development section consisted of closed-end items that focused on primarily objective information about the product development process (e,g,, percentage of engineers who used CAD), Such objective data are likely to be more accurate and less subject to retrospective sensemaking and common methods variance than more subjective data (Wagner and Crampton, 1993), One of the authors was the principal designer of the product development section. Both authors have work experience in the computer industry and academic training in computer-related fields. Several academics who were knowledgeable about technologybased firms, a venture capitalist, and several management consultants with significant experience in the industry also participated in the design. The instrument was pilot-tested at four sites, foreign and domestic. It was then revised in light of the pilot-test results.
Data gathering proceeded in several steps. First, after securing the cooperation of the firm, the research team sent the data collection instrument to the location where the products were developed. To enhance data accuracy, the instrument included not only specific questions but also detailed instructions, definitions of key terms, a document giving an overview of the research, and the names of two members of the research team whom company respondents could contact with questions at any time. Many respondents took advantage of these communication capabilities.
According to their knowledge of specific information required, different people within the firm completed particular sections of the instrument. The information for each project was completed by two to four members of the development project team, inciuding the leader. These respondents were directly involved with daily product 96/ASQ, March 1995 development. Such knowledgeable respondents helped to ensure accurate data. While completing the instrument, firm personnel called or faxed their research team contacts with questions and requests for clarification, which also helped to ensure accurate data.
After the instrument was completed, two research team members (all with field research training, most with technical backgrounds, and most completely blind to the hypotheses of this study) thoroughly reviewed the completed instrument for problems and completeness. They then met with the respondents on-site, for an average of one to two days, to verify the validity of the responses, help respondents complete any incomplete items, gather qualitative and observational data, and answer questions. These verification sessions entailed group meetings among firm personnel (including developers from both projects, project managers, and their managers) involved in completing the instrument and the two research team members. During these sessions, the product development section was reviewed to ensure accurate data. These verification sessions also served to limit further the potential for social desirability bias by involving a large number of knowledgeable individuals beyond those specifically responsible for a given project. Discrepancies were cleared up and archival data were consulted to verify dates when the accuracy of the data seemed questionable. Smaller meetings were held as appropriate. Any remaining or subsequent issues were addressed by follow-up phone calls and faxes. Japanese-speaking research team members worked with the Asian firms, while Europeans handled European firms, and U.S. members focused on U.S. firms. The instrument was available in English, Japanese, and German. The instrument used in non-Japanese (e.g., Taiwan and Korea) Asian firms was in English.
The potential for social desirability bias was reduced by the use of multiple informants in multiple settings and by the interest among informants in accurate, benchmark data for their projects in this highly competitive industry. In addition, the measures of many constructs rest on relatively objective data, which are less susceptible to social desirability biasing than subjective data. The study was also embedded in a larger study of excellence among electronics firms, so firm respondents were unaware of our specific interest in fast product development.
Common methods variance is also a concern. The potential for bias was reduced by having the instrument completed successively in different ways and at different times, initially by two to four members of the product development team and later, during the verification session, by the research team members and a larger group of firm personnel. In addition, the many types of measures, including percentages, elapsed times, types of people involved, and Likert-scale items, also limits the potential for common methods problems. Finally, as Wagner and Crampton (1993) observed in their review of numerous studies, the problem of common methods variance is often overstated.
Measures
It was critical to measure time well, as accurate measurement of time is particularly important for many concepts in this study. The start of a project was marked by the time at which the first meeting was held to consider the development of this specific product. Frequently, it also marked the first assignment of firm personnel to assess the feasibility of the product. The ending date was the date at which product stabilization was reached. Stabilization is a well-known industry term describing the time at which no more changes are made to the product. These dates were obtained from the group response of multiple informants, as described above, and were verified, as appropriate, with archival documents. This information was maintained by a product development process group in many firms.
Measuring several constructs also required dividing the product development process into phases. These phases were developed with several experienced management consultants, a senior engineering executive with twenty years of experience in the computer industry, and a venture capitalist. They were then pilot-tested at four sites. The corporate informants had little difficulty understanding and using these categories, as the phrasing and phases are common within the industry. We determined the start and end dates, the length of these phases, and their overlap with other phases from the combined response of multiple informants.
The phases are as follows: Predevelopment or the planning phase begins at the project start and ends with completion of the basic product requirements. The conceptual design begins with the completed basic product requirements and ends with final specification of the product. Product design includes the actual engineering work to take the specifications to a fully designed product and ends with final release to system test. Testing begins with component and system test and ends with release of the product to production. Process development begins with the first process design and ends at the completion of the first pilot run. Production start-up includes increases in production volume and ends at the stabilization of production. The following are descriptions of the measures for each of the hypothesized constructs.
Planning corresponds to the percentage of time that was spent on the predevelopment phase (i.e., from the start of the project to the development of basic product requirements), as designated by the respondent management group. This percentage was computed by dividing the total reported time spent on planning the product by the total elapsed time, from the start date to the end date, of the development project.
Supplier involvement in stages of the development process was measured by whether suppliers were involved in each of the stages of the product development process, as described above, and was calculated as the number of stages in which suppliers actually participated. Involvement was defined as having one or more employees of a supplier as recognized members of the product development team, actively participating in team meetings and design activities.
CAD usage was measured by the percentage of design engineers on the product development team (electronic, mechanical, and manufacturing process) who used computer-aided design systems when designing on the project. We also used a second, less direct measure, the rating by respondents of the importance of increasing CAD usage to decreasing product development time, on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all important and 5 = very important). The correlation between the two measures is .50.
Project overlap was measured by the sum of the overlaps (in months) across the six phases described above of the product development project, divided by the total development time. Higher percentages of overlap reflected more project overlap.
Multifunctional team was measured by whether personnel from specific functions were involved on the product development team during the various stages of product development. The functions were purchasing, manufacturing, marketing/sales, engineering, service, and finance/cost accounting. For each phase of the project, we calculated the total number of functions. The final multifunctional team measure is calculated by adding the total number of functions in every phase. As in the case of supplier involvement, involvement is defined as having one or more members of the function as recognized members of the product development team, including active participation in team meetings and design activities.
Reward for schedule attainment was measured by a 5-point Likert scale asking whether the product development personnel were rewarded for meeting the schedule deadlines during the course of the project (1 = never, 5 -always).
Number of design iterations was measured directly by asking how many iterations occurred in the development of the product. An iteration was defined as a redesign of at least 10 percent of a product's parts. Since the scale of this response might vary by industry segment (e.g., mainframes and personal computers may have different numbers of iterations because of differences in the nature of the product), this measure was adjusted by the average number of iterations for each industry segment. We divided the difference between the number of design iterations for a project and the average number of iterations of its corresponding industn/ segment by the average number of iterations in the industry segment. The industry segments of personal computers, peripherals, mainframes, and minicomputers that we used as our research population correspond to major product categories within the industry.
Test corresponds to the percentage of time that is spent on testing the designs. Like the planning measure above, this percentage was measured by dividing the total reported time spent on testing the product (from start to end date) by the total elapsed time, from the start date to the end date, of the development project.
Time between milestones was measured by first asking the respondent group to provide the number of formal milestones for the project, with a milestone defined as an officially scheduled project review point. The respondents were then asked the average time (weeks) between these milestones during the project. Since the scale of this response can vary by industry segment (e.g., the time scale may differ for personal computers and mainframes), this measure was adjusted in the same way as the number of design iterations.
Power of the project leader was measured by asking the respondent group where in the SBU hierarchy the project manager reported. We coded this 1 if he or she reported directly to the SBU manager (the highest reporting relationship), and 0 if the reporting relationship were with someone lower in the SBU hierarchy. As a second measure, we also assessed power by whether or not the project manager was the final decision maker on the key issues of budget, team composition, and the project timetable. The interitem correlations for these measures ranged between .33 and .50, with a Cronbach alpha of approximately .67.
Dependent and Control Variables
Development time for each development project corresponds to its duration relative to the average development time of all projects in its industry segment. The duration of each project was measured by the start and end dates of the project, as defined earlier. The average development time of all projects in each industry segment is the mean of all the reported industry segment project durations. The relative development time was calculated by dividing the difference between each project's duration and the average project duration of its corresponding industry segment by the average project duration of its industry segment. We adjusted the development time of each project by the average development time of its segment, since the projects in the personal computer segment, for example, may take considerably less time than projects in the mainframe segment and may be subject to different competitive forces pushing for completion.
Project size. As noted earlier, two projects came from each strategic business unit. One was a medium-size project while the other was a major project. Since it seems likely that major projects would take longer to complete than medium-scale ones, we controlled for these differences using a dummy variable. Zero indicates a medium-scale project, and one corresponds to a major project. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables. Table 3 presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression analyses. The first column shows the regression of the control variable against product development time. As indicated and expected, major projects take significantly longer to complete than medium-scale ones. We also controlled for regional differences (Asia, U,S., and Europe) and resource funding and found no significant effects. These results are available from the authors.
RESULTS
The second regression model adds the variables from the compression strategy to the analysis. While the overall regression is statistically significant, the results for several of the hypotheses are in the opposite direction from what we hypothesized. Planning led to slower, not faster product development, contrary to hypothesis 1, Similarly, we had hypothesized that greater supplier involvement would decrease the development time (H2), In contrast, the results indicate that greater supplier involvement slowed the pace of product development. Also contrary to our hypotheses, CAD usage, as measured by the percentage of designers using CAD (H3), slowed product development. In results available from the authors, we also found that CAD usage as In results available from the authors, we found that curvilinear models of iterations and test were not significant.
We appreciate Laura Kopczak's very helpful suggestion to perform split-sample analyses. measured by our less direct measure (i.e., perceived importance of CAD usage to shorter product development time) also slowed product development. Among these variables, only the use of cross-functional teams (H5) led to faster product development. Reward for schedule (H6) and overlap (H4) were not significant. Thus, three of the six elements of the compression strategy significantly lengthened product development time, rather than reducing it.
The third model displays the regression results for the experiential model. The overall model is significant and, unlike the compression model, the hypotheses are supported. Hypothesis 7 stated that a higher number of design iterations is associated with faster development time. Hypothesis 8 stated that longer product testing is associated with faster development time. As indicated by the third model in Table 3 , these hypotheses are significantly supported.^ Time between milestones (H9) also was significant. Finally, project leader power (H10), as measured by whether the project manager reported to the SBU manager, is also related to fast product development, although other measures of power are not significant. Thus the experiential strategy significantly shortened product development times.
The fourth model displays the full regression results for the combination of the compression, experiential, and control variables. The full model is significant and, as in the previous regressions, multifunctional teams (H5), iterations (H7), test (H8), and milestones (H9) are supported while, contrary to our hypotheses, planning (HI) and CAD (H3) significantly lengthened product development time. Supplier involvement (H2) and project leader power (H10) are no longer significant.
The fifth model is a final, parsimonious model that includes the most significant variables (p < .10) from the full model, model 4. The entire model is significant. As indicated, all variables from the experiential model in the regression are significant as well: Faster product development is associated with more testing (H8), more frequent milestones (H9), and more iterations (H7). Project leader power (H10) was dropped at the previous stage. In contrast, the compression results are less significant and sometimes opposite to those that were hypothesized: Planning (HI) and CAD usage (H3) were associated with slower product development. Supplier involvement (H2), project overlap (H4), and reward for schedule attainment (H6) were dropped at the previous stage because of lack of significance. Only multifunctional teams (H5) are positively associated with fast product development.
Split-sample Analyses
We explored the surprising results for the compression model further with split-sample analyses.^ We reasoned that perhaps the compression results would be more consistent with our hypotheses if we examined only mainframe and minicomputer projects, the 24 projects best fitting the predictability assumption of this strategy. Since these products have extensive proprietary hardware and software, their designs are more predictable from project to project and more insulated from changing technologies. Also, their markets are stable and mature {Business Week, 1994).
As indicated in the first model of Table 4 , the overall compression model is statistically significant for these more certain projects. In addition, supplier involvement (H2) and use of CAD (H3) switch signs from the full-sample analyses and are now related to fast product development in the predicted direction. Overlap (H4) becomes significant. As before, multifunctional teams (H5) are associated with fast product development. Finally, only planning (HI) significantly slows the pace of product development. The signs of four compression variables are in the predicted direction, while only two are for the full sample (Table 2 , model 2). The adjusted /^-square for the entire sample is higher, but since many results are in the reverse direction for the full sample, the compression model is a better fit with the mainframe and minicomputer sample.
In model 2, we checked the results of the compression model for less certain products, such as personal computers and peripherals. These segments are characterized by high growth rates and high technological and competitive turbulence (Business Week, 1994) . The results are similar to those of the full model, indicating weak support for the compression model. So, although the split-sample is not an ideal analysis, it does appear that, while the fuH sample is better described by the experiential model, the compression model and in particular, the CAD, overlap, and supplier involvement hypotheses are a better fit with the data when the predictability assumption is more closely met. Table 5 shows the results of the split-sample analyses to examine the experiential model. As expected, the experiential model captures the pace of less certain projects (i.e., personal computers and peripherals) better than either the pace of the full sample or the more predictable mainframe and minicomputer projects. The number of significant coefficients in the predicted direction and the .473
•p< .10; -p< .05;-p< .01.
• W = 24 (mainframe and microcomputer products). t /V = 48 (personal computer and peripheral products). 
DISCUSSION
This paper is the first, we think, to examine theoretical models of fast-paced, organizational processes. We developed two theoretical approaches from literature on the classic organizational distinction between certainty and uncertainty and tested them in a field study of 72 product development projects among large firms in the global computer industry. Several of the results are worth highlighting.
First, our results support the link between fast product development and multifunctional teams and the experiential strategy of iterations, testing, milestones, and powerful leaders. We argued that iterations and testing would rapidly build understanding and create multiple options. Frequent milestones and powerful leaders, we argued, would motivate and focus product development teams, while multifunctional teams would create a wider range of ideas. Overall, these results suggest that, in this setting, product development is well characterized as a process of navigating through unclear and shifting markets and technologies using experiential and improvisational tactics. Fast product development emerges as more uncertain than predictable, more experiential than planned, and more iterative than linear.
These findings relate to the existing product development literature in several ways. The results for multiple iterations, extensive testing, and frequent milestones extend current thinking. They suggest a more real-time, hands-on approach to fast product development, especially for uncertain products, than the compression approach that is described in much of the previous writing. The findings for the importance of powerful project team leaders and multifunctional teams strengthen the thinking and empirical 104/ASa March 1995 results of many authors (e.g., Quinn, 1985; Gold, 1987; Gupta and Wilemon, 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) by replicating them with a more systematic research design and with field data from an industry that is less Japanesedominated and less characterized by large, mechanical products.
Second, the results for CAD, supplier involvement, and overlap are mixed. Like others (e.g.. Gold, 1987; Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto, 1987; Gupta and Wilemon, 1990) , we argued that supplier involvement would simplify the process, CAD would shorten process step times, and overlapping would shorten the process. Yet for the full sample, these variables are negatively or nonsignificantly associated with fast product development. Why?
For CAD, one reason may be inappropriate implementation. In talking informally with product developers and executives after data collection, we learned that many CAD systems take a long time to learn to use effectively. Further, some firms end up with incompatible CAD systems that create new delays. Also, some designers become so involved with CAD that they get caught up in computer "hacking" and lose focus on product development. One engineer best summed up the above arguments: "to foul-up takes a human, to really foul-up takes a computer." Finally, we also learned in our informal conversations that current CAD software is often directed at automating well-known calculations and facilitating reuse of old designs. While these applications may speed predictable product design, they are poorly suited to creating new iterations and comprehensive testing. Yet the results of this study indicate that these latter applications would be very useful for speeding product development. Only in predictable projects that have well-known computational demands did CAD work well in this study.
For supplier involvement, one reason for the mixed results may be that, for less predictable projects, early involvement may be difficult to achieve because there is less certainty about which suppliers will be used. Fast developers therefore may eschew early supplier involvement in favor of last-minute supplier selection or buying off-the-shelf components in order to maintain design flexibility much later into the development process. In contrast, for predictable projects, suppliers are likely to be clear early on, and, as we argued in developing this hypothesis, it is possible and even preferable to involve them early in the process.
The mixed results for CAD, overlap, and supplier involvement also relate to the previous product development literature. These variables have been associated with fast product development by many authors (e.g., Imai, Nonaka, andTakeuchi, 1985; Rosenau, 1988; Cordero, 1991; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Mabert, Muth, and Schmenner, 1992) . What the results here suggest is that these past results (which form the heart of the compression strategy) may hold for predictable, mature products such as automobiles (Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) and heavy industrial equipment (e.g., Mabert, Muth, and Schmenner, 1992) . In contrast, they are less significant and even negative predictors of development speed for products such as personal computers, for which technology and markets are rapidly and unpredictably evolving. This suggests a contingent view of fast product development in which the compression strategy is relevant for predictable projects, while the experiential strategy is more germane to unpredictable projects. In projects with a mix of predictable and unpredictable aspects, a combination of strategies is lil<ely to be relevant.
Third, contrary to our and others' arguments, planning and rewards for schedule are associated with slow product development (e.g.. Gold, 1987; Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990; Gupta and Wilemon, 1990) , Possibly, these concepts were poorly measured. Certainly, our single Likert-scale item for reward for schedule is not a strong measure. But other explanations come to mind. One is reverse causality. Slow firms may use reward for schedule as a solution to their pace problems, not vice versa. Another possible reason is that the schedule may actually slow down developers who could move more quickly. Designers, who are rewarded for schedule, may also neglect other outcomes such as quality and adherence to specifications. This could lead to inappropriate trade-offs regarding product quality and subsequent delays or surprises downstream, which ultimately retard the process. In contrast, fast developers in this study appear to be motivated by frequent milestones, which create a sense of urgency (Gersick, 1988) and achievement (McClelland, 1961) , and by extensive testing, which creates intense task involvement (Sitkin, 1992) , For planning, one explanation is that extensive planning simply wastes time, especially in high-velocity industries such as computers. This explanation is consistent with earlier work in the industry that describes how fast strategic decision makers avoid planning because it is a futile exercise when the environment is changing rapidly and unpredictably (Eisenhardt,1989) , Thus, perhaps planning slows down the pace of the process when information is incomplete or obsolete. Consistent with situated learning (Lave and Wenger, 1991) , it may be faster to probe, test, iterate, and experience than to plan.
Beyond Product Innovation
Finally, our results relate to the broader organizational and strategic literatures. At the outset, we noted that adaptation research has shifted from whether adaptation happens to how and when it occurs (Gersick, 1994) , Punctuated equilibrium, which characterizes adaptation in terms of large, infrequent structural changes has emerged as a dominant model of adaptation (Miller and Freisen, 1984; Gersick, 1994; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994 ), Yet adaptation can also occur through small, frequent shifts in how firms compete in the marketplace. For example. Miller and Chen (1994) focused on pricing, advertising, and scheduling moves in the airline industry, Galunic and Eisenhardt (1996) examined charter or domain changes among the strategic business units within a major electronics firm. Here, we describe product development processes that may provide the same type of rapid, marketplace adaptation within the computer industry. The image is adaptation to evolving markets and technologies through a consistent, rapid flow of new products that reposition and ultimately reshape firms. As an example, Hewlett-Packard evolved from an instruments company to a computer-based one through successive new products, while Intel evolved from a memory to a microprocessor firm through product innovation (Burgelman, 1991) . This view contrasts with adaptation as wrenching, infrequent change that punctuates long periods of inertia. In this paper, we attempt to shed light on the organizational processes or, in strategy parlance, the core capabilities that create this type of rapid adaptation.
Our work also relates to the speed of organizational processes. There is surprisingly little understanding in the organizational literature of how and why processes are fast. At best, there are some traditional assumptions that speed might be achieved by skimping on analysis and information, slashing conflict, or being centralized (e.g., Vroom and Yetton, 1973; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Th^oret, 1976; Fredrickson, 1984) . Yet each of these tactics also impairs the quality and effectiveness of organizations and fails to deal with how people overcome the emotional blocks to speed, such as anxiety and procrastination. Cutting analysis and information is likely to impair quality and to sap the confidence of managers. Eliminating conflict is problematic because conflict is often linked to high-quality processes. It is also difficult to suppress. Centralization is problematic, especially in dynamic environments, because such dictatorial action often creates isolation and rigidity (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981) . So, overall, these views are likely to be too simplistic.
In contrast, the results here provide three new insights about the speed of organizational processes. One is that there is no single way to be fast. Rather, there are multiple approaches for gaining speed in organizational processes. Second, these approaches are distinct from those in the traditional organizational literature, such as cutting information, suppressing conflict, or relying on centralization. The compression tactics rely on efficiently organizing the process and then taking advantage of possibilities for overlap, technological advances such as CAD, and the expertise of others, such as suppliers. The experiential approach rests on accelerated learning through iteration and testing that is combined with the motivation and focus of leadership and frequent milestones. Here real-time interaction, flexibility, and improvisation are essential. Third, the efficacy of these approaches appears to be contingent on the task. Compression tactics build on a rational, engineering perspective from the product development literature and seem to fit best in more certain settings. In this study, they best described mainframe and minicomputer projects. In contrast, experiential tactics build on ideas about intuition and improvisation that have emerged from inductive, case research on jazz (Bastien and Hostager, 1988) , strategic choice (Eisenhardt, 1989) , and survival (Weick, 1993) . Their domain seems to be uncertain settings. In this study, they best described product innovation in the computer industry, particularly the volatile peripheral and 107/ASQ, March 1995 personal computer segments. Taken together, these insights begin to outline a more valid and complex view of fast organizational processes.
Perhaps most importantly, from an organization theory perspective, we call into question the traditional link between organic processes and uncertain situations (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; March, 1988) . Burns and Stalker (1961) characterized organic processes as lacking structure. Typical is their report of an informant's claiming, "Of course, nobody knows his job here" (p. 93). But playful, fluid organic processes fail to capture the importance of focus and structure that emerges here. Fast processes in uncertain situations may not be organic, but they are improvisational in that they combine real-time learning through design iterations and testing with the focus and discipline of milestones and powerful leaders. Thus our work joins a small but growing number of studies that challenge the relevance of organic processes to effective organization (Jelinek and Schoonhoven, 1990; Weick, 1993; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995b) and relate closely to emergent ideas on balancing order and disorder within complex, adaptive systems (Kauffman, 1992; Waldrop,1992) .
CONCLUSION
Many organizational theories have their roots in the 1970s, a time when the concerns for speed and flexibility that dominate contemporary firms were not an issue (see also Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1994) . Not surprisingly, theories such as transaction cost economics, agency, and resource dependence are static or nearly so. Institutional theory has littie to say about pace and change. Even organization ecology, which is dynamic at the population level, is largely static at the firm level. While these theories may be useful in equilibrium, they are not so appropriate for capturing organizational forms in abruptly changing, competitive settings. Yet ironically, many firms exist in industries in which moving quickly is a key core capability and fast product innovation is central to maintaining that pace.
In this paper we probed fast product innovation and, in so doing, attempted to contribute not only to the product innovation literature but also to the beginning of an outline of fast, adaptive organizational processes and, ultimately, organizational forms that fit with competitive, fast-paced situations. A more dynamic organizational paradigm that captures key features of continuously adaptive, contemporary firms is beginning to emerge.
